

Redefining Free Will: Creativity as the Core of Autonomous Agency

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ABSTRACT

This paper critiques the traditional view of free will as the capacity to choose, introducing a novel framework that redefines free will as the capacity to generate creative choices. By emphasizing the role of creativity, the paper shifts the focus from decision-making to the process of forming choices, highlighting that free will varies in degree and can be enhanced through learning and experience. This reconceptualization reconciles free will with rationality and offers a coherent explanation of human agency, addressing metaphysical concerns about determinism and indeterminism while preserving the essence of human autonomy.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you're walking along a street and there's an artist playing violin on the road side. When you're approaching the artist, you might ask yourself: should I give him the coin in my pocket?

The question you asked yourself implies that you believe firmly that (1) there are alternatives how the world will proceed, (2) what's going to happen next depends on your decision, and (3) you can effectively create a course of intended events in the world to change how it proceeds. This is almost what we mean by free will in daily talks.

A popular characterization of free will in philosophy is the ability to do otherwise[1]. This formulation regards free will as the capability to choose. I label this view of free will as the myth of choice. In this paper, I'll argue that the myth of choice is flawed, and it's not the capability to choose but the capability to generate choices that matters.

Before we start our adventure for a new conception of free will, let's see why there're a lot of noises on the topic of free will for thousand of years.

A. Problem of Free Will

The popular view of free will as the ability to do otherwise is in conflict with the metaphysical views of determinism and indeterminism – there's no place for free will no matter the world is determined or not.

If we assume determinism, i.e. any event is a necessary consequence of the physical laws and the past, then the present and future are completely determined by the past and the physical laws. It means that all our desires, beliefs and actions are determined as well, it's impossible for anyone to change the proceedings of the world, there's no real choices at all. This argument is often labeled as the consequence argument[2] in the context of determinism.

If we assume indeterminism, i.e. events of the world are not the necessary consequence of the physical laws and the past, then at least some events can happen by objective chance. If our beliefs and desires originate from random processes, it's impossible to distinguish free will from chance. This argument is often labeled as the matter of chance argument[3] in the context of indeterminism.

The crisis of free will in metaphysics also endangers our fundamental belief in ethics. Imagine the situation where a witness lied in the court, it's reasonable for us to blame him. However, if the witness was compelled to do so by death threat to him or his family members, we would be reluctant to blame him for his false testimony in court. The difference lies in whether the man doing the deed is free or not. In another word, one is only responsible for his free actions. However, if free will is impossible both in a determined world and in an undetermined world, then it seems difficult to maintain a coherent view of responsibility.

In face of the tension between free will and the scientific world view, philosophers divide mainly into two camps, namely libertarianism and compatibilism.

B. Libertarianism

Libertarians propose that there exists causally efficacious and non-physical agents, which is the source of our free will. This school of thought is often labeled as libertarianism.

Libertarianism trivially avoids the consequence argument and matter of chance argument. The Consequence argument doesn't apply as libertarianism presupposes indeterminism. The Matter of chance argument becomes invalid because a causally efficacious but non-physical agent is capable of rational choices among genuine alternatives.

Libertarianism does manage to solve the tension between free will and the scientific world view, however, by paying a price – it contradicts the contemporary scientific world view that the physical world is complete and causally closed.

The price paid is not that high as its first look. As we know, the physicists' dictionary is expanding and changing over time. Things like electromagnetic fields, photons and various new particles were added in last century, while things like phlogiston and ether were removed. There does not exist a strict boundary between physical and non-physical. In the history of science, it seems that anything that helps explain the world can appear in the dictionary thus become physical. When Newton postulated the concept force and gave it a definition, no physicists care about its ontological status as long as it works in predicting the movements of the heavenly bodies.

If libertarianism has the best explanatory power and is the simplest among all candidate theories, I think the causally efficacious agents postulated by libertarians would be added to physicists' dictionary as well when the mainstream physicists are interested in the problem.

Some libertarians may insist that the agents they postulate are non-physical. But as the boundary between non-physical and physical is obscure, and any entities that help explain phenomena of the world are potential candidates in physicist's dictionary. So I think these libertarians have to give up the belief that the agents are non-physical, and they lose nothing by giving up the view.

C. Compatibilism

On the other camp, philosophers suggest that free will is actually compatible with determinism, this view is usually labeled as compatibilism[2]. We can formulate the argument for the incompatibility between free will and determinism as follows:

P1 If determinism is true, then every human action is causally necessitated

P2 If every action is causally necessitated, no one could have acted otherwise

P3 One only has free will if one could have acted otherwise

P4 Determinism is true C No one has free will

Nearly all compatibilists deny P2 or P3, though they have nuances in their stances. The famous compatibilist, David Hume, wrote in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*(part 1):

By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; this is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may.

Hume intended to say that free will is the accord between desire and actions. It doesn't imply anything about the ability to do otherwise or existence of real choices. It's obviously this redefinition is compatible with determinism.

If we question Hume does a dog have free will, he would probably answer yes. But this seems cheating, as it changes the definition of free will!

I have to argue here that redefinition of free will is a plausible approach. First, there doesn't exist an absolute authoritative definition of free will among philosophers. Some definitions are popular than others, but popularity doesn't mean superiority. Second, the practical usage of the word free will in natural languages can't serve as a criteria, as practical usage of words are usually abundant with inaccuracies, errors, inconsistencies and conventions. Third, from an instrumentalist point of view, any definition would work as long as it is coherent and is able to explain our experiences.

Note that to some extent, the approach I'll take in this paper is similar to compatibilism, that's to redefine free will. However, regarding the definition itself, I take a very different approach from libertarians and compatibilists, while the latter two are similar. The latter two approaches regard free will as related to the capacity to choose, but I think it's the capacity to generate choices that's important. I'll explain more about this in next chapter.

The general problem with all forms of compatibilism is that it advocates a very humble definition of free will, in which human beliefs and desires are determined as well, and it's impossible to differentiate human beings from dogs and cats. This doesn't imply compatibilism is wrong, but we're more likely to buy a conception in which human dignity is preserved and human beings are not just determined and passive machines.

D. Summary

In this chapter, I briefly introduced the problem of free will, and two classical approaches to the problem of free will. The emergence of quantum physics and neural science in the last century led some scholars to rethink the possibility of free will in an undetermined world. The details of this new approach is too technical, so I please interested readers to refer to relevant materials in the field.

The dominant view in the history of philosophy and which is still popular today is to regard free will as the capacity to choose. I label this view as the myth of choice. I'll argue in next section that this view is flawed, and it's not the capability to choose but the capability to generate choices that matters. Based on this thought, I put forward a new conception of free will which is creative, comes in degrees and can be improved.

2. FREE WILL IS CREATIVE

The philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre has a famous quote saying that man is condemned to be free. For Sartre and many other philosophers, free will seems to be a magic power, once owned by an agent, can be exerted on any matters of affair. This view is a thousand year old myth, which is the source of all confusions about free will.

In this chapter, I'll try to break this myth and suggest a new conception of free will that's based on the capacity to generate choices rather than the capacity to choose.

A. The Myth of Choice

The dominant view among philosophers is to regard free will as the capacity to choose, as reflected by the popular formulation of free will as the capacity to do otherwise. I call this view the myth of choice. We can see the traces of this view in all debates about free will. It's the view advocated by libertarians, but also the view that compatibilists are struggling with. Researchers studying the possibility of free will from the perspective of quantum physics and neural science are also targeting this view of free will. If we were able to break this myth, then we would fundamentally change how people will debate and talk about free will in future. This is the task I'm going to undertake here.

In the beginning of this paper, we've seen an example where you can decide freely on whether to give the coin in your pocket to the street artist or not. It seems that each choice is at your disposal, it's completely up to you to decide. For both traditional philosophers and ordinary people, this feel of ability to make free choice seems to be essential to the concept of free will.

First of all, intuition is by no means the criteria of correctness. Every human being living on earth has strong intuition that the earth is flat, but it's not true. Our intuition of free choice might just be an illusion. As it's widely known, philosophers working intentions and actions, psychologists working on subconsciousness, physiologists working on mental disorders have already greatly weakened our intuitions of free choice.

Second, free will is not irrationality. In another word, free will is rational. It means you can't choose either A or B, you should choose the better one. If you deliberately choose the suboptimal choice, we'll not say you have free will, instead we suspect if you have some mental problems.

You might ask, does rationality reflect free will? To answer this question, let's see a short program.

```
def decide ( A, B) = {
  if (A better Than B) choose (A)
  elseif (B better Than A) choose ( B)
  else
  ...
}
```

As you can see in this program, the method decide chooses between A and B, and it's obvious that it always chooses the better one. We have to admit the program is rational, because it always makes the better choice. Does it make sense to attribute free will to such a simple mechanism? I think this capability is too trivial to qualify the name free will.

Third, free will is not hesitation. When you can't decide between two choices, you don't know what to do next, you feel unease about the uncertainty, you want to get out of the situation. You linger on one choice, while looking at the other. You intend to decide on one, but you hesitate. You swing like a pendulum between the two choices. This is a trouble instead of freedom!

This insight is also captured by the Paradox of Buridan's Ass, which was first put forward by a 14th century French philosopher Jean Buridan. The paradox says that if there are two stacks of hay in front of a rational ass with equal distance, then the rational ass would starve to death as it can't decide which stack of hay to eat. In this case, hesitation is a synonym

of being trapped, how can we say being trapped is an exhibition of free will?

From a different respect, two equally good choices might not be equal in fact, it's only that you can't tell one from the other. So in this regard, hesitation is usually a reflection of inability to decide efficiently. In such cases, you need help from experts or you need more training in the field.

If you think hesitation as some capacity that qualifies the name of free will, following program will help you to get rid of the idea.

```
def decide ( A, B) = {
  if (A better Than B) choose (A)
  elseif (B better Than A) choose ( B)
  else
    decide ( B , A)
}
```

In the program, if A and B are not equally good, then the better one is decided. If A and B are equally good, then the decide function would run forever – that's to hesitate forever. This capacity is too trivial to qualify the name of free will.

Fourth, free will is not randomness. When facing two equally good choices, we often resort to the strategy of random choice. Resorting to random choice doesn't necessarily mean resort to a true random process in the physical world. It just means to give up our control, and let external forces – which we can't predict the result – to decide. As we are passive and determined by external forces when we resort to randomness in decision, so the process doesn't reflect free will at all.

On the other hand, most cases of resorting to randomness in daily lives imply that you want to try your luck, which in turn implies you are aware that the two choices are most likely not equal, but you are unable to differentiate them. So most cases of resorting to randomness reflect the inability to choose. It's unreasonable to call this inability free will.

One may disagree on one point: isn't the act of resorting to randomness in case of equally good choices an exhibition of free will? Maybe, but the ability can also be implemented by a simple program:

```
def decide ( A, B) = {
  if (A better Than B) choose (A)
  elseif (B better Than A) choose ( B)
  else
    choose ( random ( A, B ) )
}
```

As you can see in the program, if A and B are equally good, it would randomly choose one; otherwise, it would choose the better one.

Is it possible for any conception of free will be deviant from the program regarding the capacity to choose? I can hardly imagine any. First, the decision process should be rational to some extent, i.e. to choose the better choice, or it doesn't qualify the name of free will. The rational decision process will generate a unique result as long as there's only one best answer. Second, in case of truly equally good answers, the decision process should choose one randomly, to avoid the Paradox of Buridan's Ass.

As I've showed above, there's nothing left in the capacity to choose that can honor free will. It's time to declare the bankruptcy of the myth of choice. It's not the capacity to choose that matters to free will, but something else.

B. It's About Choices, Not Choice

To break a myth is not enough, we have to replace it with another one. Next I'm going to argue that it's not the capability to choose but the capability to generate choices that matters. Nearly all definitions of free will begin with the situation where the agent is about to make a choice. Some philosophers emphasize the ability to make a different choice, some emphasize the alignment between choice and action.

But making a choice is not the primitive situation we face in daily lives. In the real world, we first face a problem, then we generate candidate choices for decisions. We've seen that the capacity to choose is unable to honor free will, then the only possibility lies with the choices. The more creative we are, the better choices can be generated and decided, thus more free we are. Free will is first and foremost a problem related to creativity. It's about choices, not choice!

From a linguistic point of view, what past philosophers care about is the adverb which modifies the verb in following

sentence:

The agent freely decided on one among the three options.

Instead, the approach I advocate in this paper would rewrite the sentence and emphasize the options part:

The agent decided on the best one among the three options he created.

Note that in the rewriting, freely is removed while best is added. This corresponds to the conclusion in previous section that the capacity to choose doesn't qualify the name of free will and the decision process should be rational to choose the best option.

If the three options are indeed created by the agent himself, the rewriting literally means the same thing. If the three options are provided by third parties, we need more complex rewriting. When we face choices provided by third parties, it's first and foremost a problem(not choice), and second a problem related to choice. We can generate different choices in order to solve the choice problem. We have to decide on one choice we generated in order to decide on the choice problem. For example, John receives two offers from two universities, he has to decide which one to decline. He would generate two choices in order to decide on the choice problem:

- (1) Choose the university which has the top overall ranking
- (2) Choose the university which has the top specialty ranking

After generating the two choices, John decided on the second one, because he's persuaded by his father that the ranking of specialty is more important than school. Then, he would be able to choose a university by the criteria he has chosen.

It's obvious that the quality of the decision mainly depends on the quality of the choices that are generated. The better choices we can generate, the greater chance we can make a better decision. If we move the focus of free will from the capacity to choose to the capacity to generate choices, we see a very different scenery. It will cast new light in the understanding of free will and reshape future debates about free will.

To make the discussion more concrete, let me first put forward a new definition of free will formally:

Free will is the ability to creatively generate action plans and choose one rationally with respect to a specific objective in a concrete scenario.

This definition doesn't sound as good as free will is creative, but in spirit they are the same. In the following, I'll analyze this new definition in details.

C. Creativity

The definition depends on the concept action plan, which is a list of actions to be executed in order to achieve a specific objective in a concrete scenario. When facing a problem, each action plan is a choice. Action plan is relative to the objective, each action in the action plan can also be an objective for sub- action plans. For example, suppose visit Paris is an action plan for having a good holiday. In turn, go to Paris by train is a possible step of an action plan for visiting Paris.

The interplay between action plan and objective can be very complex. When we are faced with a problem, to solve this problem is not what I mean by objective. Objective means what the agent can gain from solving the problem. Take the previous example of going to university, what's the objective? I can imagine a few:

- (1) Receive a good education in the field of interest
- (2) Receive a good general education
- (3) Have a good job in future
- (4) Have a good life in future(not only professional, but overall)

As you can see, there are means and end relationship among the objectives – for example, receive a good education in the field of interest can be seen as a means to have a good job in the future. Then how do we fix one objective in order to make a decision? This is actually a very creative process. First, it's reasonable to assume that each agent has some values, or it's impossible for the agent to make any reasonable decisions. The creative process is try to create a network of choices that bridges between the original problem and the values, as illustrated in the following graph:

In the graph above, in order to solve the first problem, we generate three options, which in turn becomes a problem itself. To solve the second problem, we generate two options. Now the third problem can be solved using the values of the agent as objective, we suppose the option 5 is chosen. In turn, the option 5 can serve as an objective for problem 2, then the option 1 is chosen – that's how the first problem is solved. In reality, the graph construction process may begin from both




Fig. 1. Flow diagram of multi-problem decision structure

ends in order to bridge the original problem with values of the agent. The intermediate options generated depends on the agent's beliefs, skills, environment, etc. For most problems, there are infinite possible ways on how to bridge between the original problem and the agent's values, it's a very creative process.

Human beings can profit their linguistic capabilities to generate action plans creatively. The simplest method is to negate a sentence. For example, from visit Paris we can get don't visit Paris. Substitution is also a widely used technique. For example, instead of going to visit Paris, one may go to Geneva. The natural language is a huge source of creativity in generating action plans.

Note that the quality of action plans matters more than the quantity. The quality of an action plan is determined by how much it can contribute to the agent's intrinsic values. For example, if you want to go from Geneva to Paris in the shortest delay, there are a lot of transportation possibilities, among them one is the best. A person generating the best action plan is more creative than the person who can't, even though the latter might generate more but lower quality plans. However, in many scenarios, quantity matters as well, as only through comparison we can be sure if a choice is optimal or not. Shopping is a typical example.

According to the new definition, free will is creative – the better action plans are, more free the agent is. The creativity of agents varies in degrees. A person is more creative than a child or a dog in how to get the banana which they can't reach. A chess program is usually more creative than a chess master in generating alternative plans, though they generate plans by completely different processes. A poet is more creative than a computer in writing poems.

The definition also implies that free will comes in degrees. In the same scenario with the same objective, the agent who can generate and decide on a better action plan is more free than the other one.

This definition implies free will can be improved. If an agent is able to learn to generate better action plans, it will become more free. It's consistent with our intuitions, and can easily provide an answer to the question when does a child have free will. A chess program that can learn from failures to generate better action plans in future will become more and more free. Does this mean free will is a synonym of intelligence? To some extent, I admit the two concepts are closely related. However, as intelligence is an obscure concept to be defined, I will not pursue the topic here.

D. Thematicity

Free will is not a universal currency that can be used everywhere, it's more like tickets which can be used at specific places.

Talk of free will should be restricted to a proper topic. The correct grammar for talking about free will is X exhibits free will in T. The topic T can't be omitted, or the sentence is incomplete and incomprehensible unless T is implicit in the context. For example, chess program exhibits free will in playing chess games, but not in speaking english. A child exhibits free will in movements of one's body(mouth, hand, foot, etc), but not in the circulation of blood, digestion or cell fission. However, a doctor may exhibit free will in circulation of blood, digestion and even cell fission by employing his professional knowledge to make plans to tune the functioning of his body. A musician may exhibit free will in music composition, but a man who doesn't know music at all can't. Free will is not a nature of human beings, but a nurture. The more one learns on a topic, the more creative thus more free he would be on the topic. If one doesn't know anything about a topic, he would not be very different from a cow attending a concert. Millionaires are rarely respected by artists just because they buy and sell masterpieces of art.

For human beings, it's impossible for one to be an expert on all the topics he faces in life. So we delegate health to doctors, social issues to politicians, education of child to schools, etc. However, there is one thing we can't delegate, that's how to spend the whole life. If we just follow the prototypical life roads of the public opinion, we're not showing any free will on the topic of life, even though we are very successful in our professions. To be more free in one's life, we have to learn how to be more creative in life choices.

E. Rationality

As I argued before, the capacity to decide can't be irrational, or it doesn't qualify the name of free will. However, there's a weakness here because the rationality of different agents may vary in degrees, far from being perfect. Generally, if we can justify the decision of an agent with respect to the specific objective in the concrete scenario based on the history of the agent, then we can say that the agent decides rationally.

However, generate action plans and choose rationally don't necessarily imply that free will involves deliberative processes. The process may also be consciousnessless computations. For example, a chess program can also generate action plans internally and choose the best one in a concrete scenario in order to win the chess.

F. Summary

In this section, based on the critique of the myth of choice, I advocate that it's the capacity to generate choices instead of the capacity to choose that is important to free will. Then I put forward a new definition of free will, which is creative, varies in degrees and can be improved.

In the next section, I'm going to discuss possible attacks on the new conception of free will and respond to them.

3. POSSIBLE ATTACKS AND RESPONSES

A good boxer should not only be good at attacking, but also defense. In this section I'll discuss possible attacks on the new definition of free will and respond to them.

A. Do Trees, Dogs and Chess Programs Have Free Will

The explicit requirement of generating action plans and choosing rationally prohibits us from attributing free will to trees. Trees get rid of their leaves in autumn to protect their lives during the winter, but there's no evidence of generation of action plans in order for us to attribute free will to them. In another word, tree doesn't show creativity at all to deserve the title of free will.

One may point out that according to the definition, dogs and chess programs have free will in some respects, which seems to conflict with our intuitions. We don't have to worry here, we can still be proud of our free will, as human beings have free will on hugely more topics than dogs and chess programs. Even on the same topic, human beings are usually much more creative than dogs, thus exhibit a higher degree of free will. In addition, attributing free will to a chess program does not change the fact that it lacks consciousness, linguistic capabilities, and a lot of values human beings could have.

B. Do Organizations Have Free Will

Another worry with the definition might be that it seems that we can attribute free will to organizations, such as companies, political parties, etc. It's obvious that in economical activities, a company can generate action plans creatively and decide rationally. Does this justify the attribution of free will to a company? If it's justified to do so, is free will used in a figurative sense or not? I think it's justified to attribute free will to a company in economical activities, and the usage of free will here is not in a figurative sense. This view is consistent with the fact that organizations are valid subjects of crime in economical laws, but not in traffic laws. Free will is only related to some capacity, nothing more.

C. How Many Action Plans are Required

If we play arithmetic game with a child, and the child manages to answer all questions related to simple addition and subtraction questions, we would praise the child – no doubt we would attribute free will to the child. But what if we play the arithmetic game with a calculator? Should we attribute free will to a calculator?

And we can imagine an even simpler game as follows: Your task is to guess what will be the output of the program, and make your guess known to the program. If you guess 1, the program would output 0. If you guess 0, the progress would output 1.

This is a game that you are destined to lose. It seems silly, but it's still OK to call it a game. The question is, does this game qualify the name of free will?

The similarity between the calculator and the game is that they go directly to the optimal solution. But that's also the same way how masters in a field work. They are so experienced in their skills that they seem to work out of instinct. An awkward speaker may need to deliberate on the wording, but an orator speaks just like the flow of water. An experienced student in calculus can directly produce the integral of a function, while an inexperienced student may have to try different methods.

So how many action plans should be generated in order to qualify free will? Can we attribute free will to an agent with just one action plan? We can attribute free will to masters in a field even there's only one action plan, but I hesitate to attribute free will to the calculator and simple game above, as they are not agents, they have no values. This crucial property differentiates them from skilled masters in a field.

D. Is It Compatible with Determinism

To answer this question, let's recall the formulation of the incompatibility between determinism and free will:

P1 If determinism is true, then every human action is causally necessitated

P2 If every action is causally necessitated, no one could have acted otherwise

P3 One only has free will if one could have acted otherwise

P4 Determinism is true C No one has free will

As we have a new definition of free will, I would change P3 to P3* as follows:

P3* One only has free will if one showed creativity in generating choices

After this change, it seems free will and determinism are compatible, as creativity doesn't depend on magical powers. In the real world, we've seen a lot of programs and robots are capable to learn and show creativity in solving problems.

Some might point out that is it possible our creativity is determined? I agree it's a possibility, but I doubt determinism is an accurate, complete and final image of the complex world. The new definition of free will is neutral to different metaphysical stances of the world. What's free will and how is free will possible are two different questions. The answer to the first question doesn't depend on the second. However, the answer to the second question depends on the answer to the first one.

E. Is Responsibility Still Possible

Generally speaking, there are two broad philosophical interpretations of the concept responsibility, namely merit-based view and consequentialist view[4].

According to the merit-based view, praise or blame would be an appropriate reaction toward the agent if and only if he merits such a reaction. For blame or praise to be appropriate, there must be actual alternatives open to the agent and the agent should have acted freely, as the slogan goes no responsibility without freedom.

However, according to consequentialist view, praise or blame would be appropriate if and only if a reaction of this sort would likely lead to a better change, e.g. the agent improves his behavior. For most compatibilists, blaming and praising are just means of social regulation.

Regarding the new conception of free will, if one does something creatively, then he deserves the reward. Some may disagree that the creativity is historically determined. I'd like to say that the object of the reward is a person who has a body and would one day age and die. His creativity might be determined, but it takes part of his life to acquire and maintain the creativity. So in this case, the merit-based view applies. With this line of argument, I also think that trained animals like police dogs also deserve reward in their creative performance, even it's insane to do so from the consequentialist view.

However, when a person lacks the creativity required to performance well, it seems the merit-based view doesn't apply, because this situation is determined. In this case, consequentialist view applies – it makes sense to reward, punish or show tolerance as long as the reaction helps the person to improve his creativity.

4. CONCLUSION

In this paper I showed that all previous discussions about free will are based on the myth of choice, which views free will as the capacity to choose. I showed that this view is flawed and should be abandoned.

Instead of thinking free will as the capacity to choose, I propose we should think it as the capacity to generate choices. Based on this view, free will is creative, varies in degrees and can be improved.

If I were successful in the two tasks above, then it would cast light on the puzzle of free will and reshape future debates about free will.

However, I don't claim that all problems about free will are solved, as people may ask what's the essence of human creativity. Nevertheless, creativity is a concept much less mysterious than the magic capability to choose, as we are acquainted with animals and intelligent programs which are able to exhibit creativity. What I tried to do and hopefully managed to doing is to demystify free will.

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